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January 29, 2019
Submitted via www.regulations.gov
Kenneth L. Marcus
Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights
Department of Education
400 Maryland Avenue SW
Washington DC, 20202
Re: ED Docket No. ED-2018-OCR-0064, RIN 1870-AA14, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in
Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance.
Dear Mr. Marcus,
I am writing on behalf of the Maine Women’s Lobby in response to the Department of Education’s (the
Department) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM” or “proposed rules”) to express our strong
opposition to the Department’s proposal to amend rules implementing Title IX of the Education
Amendment Act of 1972 (Title IX) as published in the Federal Register on November 29, 2018.

My name is Whitney Parrish, and I am the Director of Policy and Program for the Maine
Women’s Lobby, which has advocated on issues affecting the lives of 678,000 Maine women
and girls for the past 40 years. The Maine Women’s Lobby works on behalf of all Maine women
to create a future that is free from violence, free from discrimination, with access to health care,
and real economic security. We are deeply troubled by the proposed rules that would
fundamentally undermine the purpose of Title IX. We feel that the proposed rule changes would
not keep students safe from sexual, domestic, and power-based personal violence in its many
forms. We also fear that the changes would jeopardize any viable pathway provided by the Title
IX process to achieve safety and an adequate educational experience for any survivor of sexual,
domestic, or power-based personal balance. The changes to these rules explicitly undermine our
mission to help create a future free from violence and discrimination, and we strongly oppose
them for the below reasons.
I.The proposed rules fail to respond to the realities of sexual harassment in schools.
The proposed rules ignore the devastating impact of sexual violence in schools. Instead of effectuating
Title IX’s purpose of keeping students safe from sexual abuse and other forms of sexual harassmentthat
is, from unlawful sex discriminationthey make it harder for students to report abuse, allow (and sometimes
require) schools to ignore reports when they are made, and unfairly tilt the investigation process in favor of
respondents to the direct detriment of survivors. For the reasons discussed at length in this comment, the
Maine Women’s Lobby unequivocally opposes the Department’s proposed rule.
a. Sexual harassment is far too common in our schools.
Far too many students experience sexual harassment:

•
•
•

In grades 7-12, 56% of girls and 40% of boys are sexually harassed in any given school
year. More than 1 in 5 girls ages 14-18 are kissed or touched without their consent.
During college, 62% of women and 61% of men experience sexual harassment. More
than 1 in 5 women and nearly 1 in 18 men are sexually assaulted in college.
Men and boys are far more likely to be victims of sexual assault than to be falsely
accused of it.

Historically marginalized and underrepresented groups are more likely to experience sexual
harassment than their peers:
• 56% of girls ages 14-18 who are pregnant or parenting are kissed or touched without their
consent.
• More than half of LGBTQ students ages 13-21 are sexually harassed at school.
• Nearly 1 in 4 transgender and gender-nonconforming students are sexually assaulted
during college.
• Students with disabilities are 2.9 times more likely than their peers to be sexually
assaulted.
Sexual harassment occurs both on-campus and in off-campus spaces closely associated with school:
• Nearly 9 in 10 college students live off campus.
• 41% of college sexual assaults involve off-campus parties. Students are far more likely to
experience sexual assault if they are in a sorority (nearly 1.5x more likely) or fraternity
(nearly 3x more likely).
• Only 8% of all sexual assaults occur on school property.
b. Survivors generally underreport instances of sexual harassment and assault.
Reporting sexual harassment is always hard, and the proposed rules would further discourage
students from coming forward to ask their schools for help. Already, only 12% of college survivors and
2% of girls ages 14-18 report sexual assault to their schools or the police. Students often choose not to
report for fear of reprisal, because they believe their abuse was not important enough, or because they
think the no one would do anything to help. Some students—especially students of color, undocumented
students, LGBTQ students, and students with disabilities—are less likely than their peers to report sexual
assault to the police due to increased risk of being subjected to police violence and/or deportation.
Survivors of color may not want to report to the police and add to the criminalization of men and boys of
color. For these students, schools are often the only avenue for relief.
When schools fail to provide effective responses, the impact of sexual harassment can be
devastating. Too many survivors end up dropping out of school because they do not feel safe on campus;
some are even expelled for lower grades in the wake of their trauma. For example, 34% of college
survivors drop out of college.
II.

The proposed rules would hobble Title IX enforcement, discourage reporting of sexual
harassment, and prioritize protecting schools over protecting survivors.

For the better part of two decades, the Department has used one consistent standard to determine
if a school violated Title IX by failing to adequately address sexual harassment and assault. The
Department’s 2001 Guidance, which went through public notice-and-comment and has been enforced in
both Democratic and Republican administrations, defines sexual harassment as “unwelcome conduct of a
sexual nature.” The 2001 Guidance requires schools to address student-on-student harassment if any
employee “knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known” about the harassment. In the
context of employee-on-student harassment, the Guidance requires schools to address harassment

“whether or not the [school] has ‘notice’ of the harassment.” Under the 2001 Guidance, schools that do
not “take immediate and effective corrective action” would violate Title IX. These standards have
appropriately guided OCR’s enforcement activities, effectuating Title IX’s nondiscrimination mandate by
requiring schools to quickly and effectively respond to serious instances of harassment and fulfilling
OCR’s purpose of ensuring equal access to education and enforcing students’ civil rights.
This standard appropriately differs from the higher bar erected by the Supreme Court in the very
specific and narrow context of a Title IX lawsuit seeking monetary damages against a school because of
sexual harassment. To recover monetary damages, a plaintiff must show that their school was deliberately
indifferent to known sexual harassment that was severe and pervasive and deprived a student of access to
educational opportunities and benefits. But in establishing that standard the Court recognized that it was
specific to private suits seeking monetary damages, not to administrative enforcement. It specifically
noted that the standard it announced did not affect agency action: the Department was still permitted to
administratively enforce rules addressing a broader range of conduct to fulfill Congress’s direction to
effectuate Title IX’s nondiscrimination mandate. It drew a distinction between “defin[ing] the scope of
behavior that Title IX proscribes” and identifying the narrower circumstances in which a school’s failure
to respond to harassment supports a claim for monetary damages. The 2001 Guidance directly addressed
this, concluding that it was inappropriate for the Department to limit its enforcement activities to the
narrower damages standard and that the Department would continue to enforce the broad protections
provided under Title IX. Indeed, in the current proposed regulations, the Department acknowledges that it
is “not required to adopt the liability standards applied by the Supreme Court in private suits for money
damages.” As set out in further detail below, the Supreme Court’s notice requirement, definition of
harassment, and deliberate indifference standard, designed to account for the unique circumstances that
present themselves when determining monetary liability, have no place in the far different context of
administrative enforcement with its iterative process and focus on voluntary corrective action by schools.
By choosing to import those liability standards, the Department confuses its enforcement mechanisms
with court processes than have no place in administrative proceedings, threatening devastating effects on
students.
a. The proposed rules’ notice and deliberate indifference standards and definition of
sexual harassment create inconsistent rules for students versus employees.
Under Title VII, the federal law that addresses workplace harassment, a school is potentially
liable for harassment of an employee if the harassment is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim’s employment” (emphasis added). If the employee is harassed by a coworker or
other third party, the school is liable if (1) it “knew or should have known of the misconduct” and (2)
failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. If the employee is harassed by a supervisor,
the school is automatically liable if the harassment resulted in a tangible employment action such as firing
or demotion, and otherwise unless the school can prove that the employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of opportunities offered by the school to address harassment. However, under the proposed
rules, a school would only be liable for harassment against a student if it is (1) deliberately indifferent to
(2) sexual harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it denied the student
access to the school’s program or activity; (3) the harassment occurred within the school’s program or
activity; and (4) a school employee with “the authority to institute corrective measures” had “actual
knowledge” of the harassment. In other words, under the proposed rules, schools would be held to a far
lesser standard in addressing the harassment of students—including minors—under its care than
addressing harassment of adult employees.
Moreover, in contrast to the Title VII approach, which recognizes employer responsibility for
harassment enabled by supervisory authority, and in contrast to the 2001 Guidance, the proposed rule

does not recognize any higher obligation by schools to address harassment of students by school
employees who are exercising authority over students. The 2001 Guidance imposed liability when an
employee “is acting (or . . . reasonably appears to be acting) in the context of carrying out these
responsibilities over students” and engages in sexual harassment. By jettisoning this standard, the
Department would free schools from liability in many instances even when their employees use the
authority they exercise as school employees to harass students. Under the proposed rules, for example,
serial abusers like Larry Nassar, who assaulted hundreds of students in his role as a school doctor, would
not be held responsible for harassment that survivors were too embarrassed or afraid to report.
The drastic differences between Title VII and the proposed rules would mean that in many
instances schools are prohibited from taking the same steps to protect children in schools that they are
required to take to protect adults in the workplace, as set out further below. And when they are not
affirmatively prohibited from taking action, the proposed rules still create a more demanding standard for
children in schools than for adults in the workplace to get help in ending sexual harassment.
b. The proposed notice requirement undermines Title IX’s discrimination protections by
making it harder to report sexual harassment and assault. (§§ 106.44(a) & 106.30)
Under the proposed rules, schools would only be responsible for addressing sexual harassment
when one of a small subset of school employees actually knew about the harassment. Schools would not
be required to address sexual harassment unless there was “actual knowledge” of the harassment by (i) a
Title IX coordinator, (ii) a K-12 teacher (but only for student-on-student harassment, not employee-onstudent harassment); or (iii) an official who has “the authority to institute corrective measures.” This is a
dramatic change, as the Department has long required schools to address student-on-student sexual
harassment if almost any school employee either knows about it or should reasonably have known about
it. This standard takes into account the reality that many students disclose sexual abuse to employees who
do not have the authority to institute corrective measures, both because students seeking help turn to the
adults they trust the most and because students are not informed about which employees have authority to
address the harassment. The 2001 Guidance also requires schools to address all employee-on-student
sexual harassment, “whether or not the [school] has ‘notice’ of the harassment.” The 2001 Guidance
recognized the particular harms of students being preyed on by adults and students’ vulnerability to
pressure from adults to remain silent and accordingly acknowledged schools’ heightened responsibilities
to address harassment by their employees.
Under the proposed rules, in contrast, if a K-12 student told a non-teacher school employee they
trust—such as a guidance counselor, teacher aide, or athletics coach—that they had been sexually
assaulted by another student, the school would have no obligation to help the student. If a K-12 student
told a teacher that she had been sexually assaulted by another teacher or other school employee, the
school would have no obligation to help her. Perversely, the proposed rules thus provide a more limited
duty for K-12 schools to respond to a student’s allegations of sexual harassment by a school employee
than by a student. And if a college student told their professor or RA that they had been raped by another
student, by a professor, or by another employee at the university, the school would have no obligation to
help them.
Sexual assault is already very difficult to talk about. Sections 106.44(a) and 106.30 would mean
even when students find the courage to talk to the adult school employees they trust, schools would
frequently have no obligation to respond. For example, if the proposed rules had been in place, colleges
like Michigan State and Penn State would have had no responsibility to stop Larry Nassar and Jerry
Sandusky—just because their victims reported their experiences to school employees like athletic trainers
and coaches, who are not considered to be school officials who have the “authority to institute corrective

measures.” These proposed provisions would absolve some of the worst Title IX offenders of legal
liability.
c. The proposed definition of harassment improperly prevents schools from providing a
safe learning environment.
The proposed rule defines sexual harassment as “unwelcome conduct on the basis of sex that is so
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denies a person equal access to the
[school’s] education program or activity” and mandates dismissal of complaints of harassment that do not
meet this standard. Under this definition, even if a student reports sexual harassment to the “right person,”
their school would still be required to ignore the student’s Title IX complaint if the harassment hasn’t yet
advanced to a point that it is actively harming a student’s education. A school would be required to
dismiss such a complaint even if it involved harassment of a minor student by a teacher or other school
employee. The Department’s proposed definition is out of line with Title IX purposes and precedent,
discourages reporting, and excludes many forms of sexual harassment that interfere with access to
educational opportunities.
The Department does not provide a persuasive justification to change the definition of sexual
harassment from that in the 2001 Guidance, which defines sexual harassment as “unwelcome conduct of a
sexual nature.” The current definition rightly charges schools with responding to harassment before it
escalates to a point that students suffer severe harm. But under the Department’s proposed, narrower
definition of harassment, students would be forced to endure repeated and escalating levels of abuse, from
a student or teacher, before their schools would be required to investigate and stop the harassment. If a
student is turned away by their school after reporting sexual harassment, the student is extremely unlikely
to report a second time when the harassment escalates.
The Department repeatedly attempts to justify its proposed definition by citing “academic
freedom and free speech.” But harassment is not protected speech if it creates a “hostile environment,”
i.e., if the harassment limits a student’s ability to participate in or benefit from a school program or
activity. And schools have the authority to regulate harassing speech; the Supreme Court held in Tinker v.
Des Moines that school officials can regulate student speech if they reasonably forecast “substantial
disruption of or material interference with school activities” or if the speech involves “invasion of the
rights of others.” There is no conflict between Title IX’s regulation of sexually harassing speech in
schools and the First Amendment.
d. Proposed rules §§ 106.30 and 106.45(b)(3) would require schools to ignore harassment
that occurs outside of a school activity, even when it creates a hostile educational
environment.
The proposed rules would require schools to ignore all complaints of off-campus or online sexual
harassment that happen outside of a school-sponsored program—even if the student is forced to see their
harasser on campus every day and the harassment directly impacts their education as a result. To
understand why it is crucial to maintain Title IX protections for off-campus activity, one only need to
look at the Department’s own recent decision to cut off partial funding to the Chicago Public Schools for
failing to address two reports of off-campus sexual assault, which the Department described as “serious
and pervasive violations under Title IX.” In one case, a 10 grade student was forced to perform oral sex
in an abandoned building by a group of 13 boys, 8 of which she recognized from school. In the other case,
another 10th grade student was given alcohol and sexually abused by a teacher in his car. If the proposed
rule becomes final, school districts would be required to dismiss similarly egregious complaints simply
because they occurred off-campus, even if they result in a hostile educational environment.
th

The proposed rule conflicts with Title IX’s statutory language, which does not depend on where
the underlying conduct occurred but instead prohibits discrimination that “exclude[s a person] from
participation in, . . . denie[s a person] the benefits of, or . . . subject[s a person] to discrimination under
any education program or activity . . . .” For almost two decades, the Department’s guidance documents
have agreed that schools are responsible for addressing sexual harassment if it is “sufficiently serious to
deny or limit a student’s ability to participate in or benefit from the education program,” regardless of
where it occurs.
The Department’s proposed rules ignore the reality that sexual harassment that happens off
campus and outside of a school activity is no less traumatic than on-campus harassment. The negative
impact on the student’s education is typically the same if they are forced to see their harasser regularly at
school. Almost 9 in 10 college students live off campus, and much of student life takes place outside of
school-sponsored activities. If a student is assaulted off-campus by a professor, his college would be
required to ignore his complaints—even if he has to continue taking the professor’s class. If a college
student is raped at an off-campus party, their college wouldn’t need to investigate—even if they see their
rapist every day in class, the dining hall, or residential hallways. If schools interpret the proposed rule to
prevent them from addressing assault or harassment that occurs off campus in fraternity or sorority
houses, this is particularly troubling: students of all genders are more likely to be sexually assaulted if
they belong to a fraternity or sorority. Additionally, the proposed rule change would pose particular risks
to students at community colleges and vocational schools. Because none of these students live on campus,
when they are harassed by faculty or other students it is likely to occur off campus.

e. The Department’s proposed “deliberate indifference” standard would allow schools to
do virtually nothing in response to complaints of sexual harassment and assault.
The “deliberate indifference” standard adopted by the proposed rules is a much lower standard
than that currently required of schools under current guidance, which requires schools to act “reasonably”
and “take immediate and effective corrective action” to resolve harassment complaints. Under the
proposed rules, by contrast, schools would simply have to not be deliberately indifferent—which means
that their response to harassment would be deemed to comply with Title IX as long as it was not clearly
unreasonable. As long as a school follows various procedural requirements set out in the proposed rules,
the school’s response to harassment complaints could not be challenged. The practical effects of this
proposed rule would shield schools from any accountability under Title IX, even if a school mishandles a
complaint, fails to provide effective supports for survivors, and wrongly determines against the weight of
the evidence that an accused harasser was not responsible for sexual assault.
Just yesterday (1/28/19), The Bangor Daily News reported on the stories of two rape survivors
who attended the University of Maine System and felt that the Title IX process with which they engaged
had woefully endangered them due to errors in how their cases were handled. If anything, this speaks to
strengthening the process, as well as protections to survivors of violence, not weaken them in the way the
rule changes like this propose.
III.

The proposed rules impermissibly limit the “supportive measures” available to
complainants (§ 106.30).

Under the proposed rules, even if a student suffered harassment that occurred on campus and it
was “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive,” their school would still be able to deny the student the
“supportive measures” they need to stay in school. In particular, the proposed rules allow schools to deny
a student’s request for effective “supportive measures” on the grounds that the requested measures are
“disciplinary,” “punitive,” or “unreasonably burden[] the other party.” For example, a school might feel

constrained from transferring a named harasser to another class or dorm because it would “unreasonably
burden” him, thereby forcing a survivor to change all of her own class and housing assignments in order
to avoid her harasser. In addition, schools may interpret this propose rule to prohibit issuing a one-way
no-contact order against an assailant and require a survivor to agree to a mutual no-contact order, which
implies that the survivor is at least partially responsible for their own assault. This is a departure from
longstanding practice under the 2001 Guidance, which instructed schools to “direct[] the harasser to have
no further contact with the harassed student” but not vice-versa. And groups such as the Association for
Student Conduct Administration (ASCA) agrees that “[e]ffective interim measures, including … actions
restricting the accused, should be offered and used while cases are being resolved, as well as without a
formal complaint.”
IV.

The proposed rules would allow schools to claim “religious” exemptions for violating Title
IX with no warning to students or prior notification to the Department.

The current rules allow religious schools to claim religious exemptions by notifying the
Department in writing and identifying which Title IX provisions conflict with their religious beliefs. The
proposed rules remove that requirement and permit schools to opt out of Title IX without notice or
warning to the Department or students. This would allow schools to conceal their intent to discriminate,
exposing students to harm, especially women and girls, LGBTQ students, pregnant or parenting students
(including those who are unmarried), and students who access or attempt to access birth control or
abortion.
Further, the Department’s proposed assurances directly conflict with the current and proposed
rules requiring that each covered educational institution “notify” all applicants, students, employees, and
unions “that it does not discriminate on the basis of sex.” By requiring a school to tell students that it does
not discriminate while simultaneously allowing it to opt out of anti-discrimination provisions whenever it
chooses, the Department is creating a system that enables schools to actively mislead students. This baitand-switch practice demonstrates that the Department is more interested in protecting schools from
liability when they discriminate than protecting students from discrimination.
V.

The grievance procedures required by the proposed rules would impermissibly tilt the
process in favor of named harassers, retraumatize complainants, and conflict with Title
IX’s nondiscrimination mandate.

Current Title IX regulations require schools to “adopt and publish grievance procedures that
provide for a prompt and equitable resolution of student and employee complaints” of sexual misconduct.
The proposed rules purport to require “equitable” processes as well. However, the proposed rules are also
riddled with language that would require schools to conduct their grievance procedures in a
fundamentally inequitable way that favors respondents.
The Department repeatedly uses the purported need to increase protections of respondents’ “due
process rights” to justify weakening Title IX protections for complainants and proposes a provision
specifying that nothing in the rules would require a school to deprive a person of their due process rights.
But the current Title IX regulations already provide more rigorous due process protections than are
required under the Constitution. The Supreme Court has held that students facing short-term suspensions
from public schools require only “some kind of” “oral or written notice” and “some kind of hearing.” The
Court has explicitly said that a 10-day suspension does not require “the opportunity to secure counsel, to
confront and cross-examine witnesses supporting the charge, or to call his own witnesses to verify his
version of the incident.” The Court has also approved at least one circuit court decision holding that
expulsion from a public school does not require “a full-dress judicial hearing.” Furthermore, the

Department’s 2001 Guidance already instructs schools to protect the “due process rights of the accused.”
Adding § 106.6(d)(2) provides no new or necessary protections and inappropriately pits Title IX’s civil
rights mandate against the Constitution when no such conflict exists.
a.
The proposed rule’s requirement that a respondent be presumed not responsible for
harassment is inequitable and inappropriate in school proceedings.
Under proposed rule § 106.45(b)(1)(iv), schools would be required to presume that the reported
harassment did not occur, which would ensure partiality to the respondent. This presumption would also
exacerbate rape myths upon which many of the proposed rules are based—namely, the myth that women
and girls often lie about sexual assault. The presumption of innocence is a criminal law principle,
incorrectly imported into this context; criminal defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty
because their very liberty is at stake—criminal defendants go to prison if they are found guilty. There is
no such principle in civil proceedings or civil rights proceedings, and Title IX is a civil rights law that
ensures that sexual harassment is never the end to anyone’s education.
Section 106.45(b)(1)(iv) would only encourage schools to ignore or punish historically
marginalized and underrepresented groups that report sexual harassment for “lying” about it. Schools may
be more likely to ignore or punish survivors who are women and girls of color, pregnant and parenting
students, and LGBTQ students because of harmful race and sex stereotypes that label them as
“promiscuous.”
Women and girls of color: Women and girls of color already face unfair discipline due to race and sex
stereotypes. Schools are also more likely to ignore, blame, and punish women and girls of color who
report sexual harassment due to harmful race and sex stereotypes that label them as “promiscuous.” For
example, Black women and girls are commonly stereotyped as “Jezebels,” Latina women and girls as
“hotblooded,” Asian American and Pacific Islander women and girls as “submissive, and naturally
erotic,” Native women and girls as “sexually violable as a tool of war and colonization,” and multiracial
women and girls as “tragic and vulnerable, historically, products of sexual and racial domination”
(internal quotations and brackets omitted). Black women and girls are especially likely to be punished by
schools. For example, The Department’s 2013-14 Civil Rights Data Collection (CRDC) shows that Black
girls are five times more likely than white girls to be suspended in K-12, and that while Black girls
represented 20% of all preschool enrolled students, they were 54% of preschool students who were
suspended. the Department’s 2015-16 CRDC again shows that Black girls are more likely to be
suspended and expelled than other girls. Schools are also more likely to punish Black women and girls by
labeling them as the aggressor when they defend themselves against their harassers or when they respond
to trauma because of stereotypes that they are “angry” and “aggressive.”
Pregnant or parenting students: Women and girls who are pregnant or parenting are more likely to
experience sexual harassment than their peers, due in part to the stereotype that they are more
“promiscuous” because they have engaged in sexual intercourse in the past. For example, 56% of girls
ages 14-18 who are pregnant or parenting are kissed or touched without their consent.
LGBTQ students: LGBTQ students are more likely to experience sexual harassment than their peers. For
example, more than half of LGBTQ students ages 13-21 are sexually harassed at school, and nearly 1 in 4
transgender and gender-nonconforming students are sexually assaulted during college. However, LGBTQ
students are also less likely to report sexual assault to school authorities or the police because they are
rightfully concerned about further discrimination or retaliation due to their LGBTQ status. They are also
less likely to be believed due to stereotypes that they are more “promiscuous” or bring the “attention”
upon themselves.

Students with disabilities: As the Department notes in the preamble, students with disabilities have
different experiences, challenges, and needs.” But the proposed rules are especially harmful to students
with disabilities, who already face additional barriers to equal access to education and are 2.9 times more
likely than their peers to be sexually assaulted. They are also less likely to be believed due to stereotypes
about people with disabilities and often have greater difficulty describing the harassment they experience.
This presumption conflicts with the current Title IX rules and other proposed rules, which require
that schools provide “equitable” resolution of complaints. A presumption in favor of one party against the
other is not equitable. This proposed presumption is also in significant tension with proposed §
106.45(b)(1)(ii), which states that “credibility determinations may not be based on a person’s status as a
complainant” or “respondent.”
b. The proposed rules would improperly require survivors and witnesses in college and
graduate school to submit to live cross-examination by their named harasser’s advisor
of choice, causing further trauma.
Proposed rule § 106.45(b)(3)(vii) requires colleges and graduate schools to conduct a “live
hearing,” and requires parties and witnesses to submit to cross-examination by the other party’s “advisor
of choice” often an attorney who is prepared to grill the survivor about the traumatic details of the
assault, or possibly an angry parent or a close friend of the named harasser. The adversarial and
contentious nature of cross-examination would further traumatize college and graduate school survivors
who seek help through Title IX. Being asked detailed, personal, and humiliating questions often rooted in
gender stereotypes and rape myths that tend to blame victims for the assault they experienced would
understandably discourage many students—parties and witnesses— from participating in a Title IX
grievance process, chilling those who have experienced or witnessed harassment from coming forward.
Nor would the proposed rules entitle the survivor to the procedural protections that witnesses have during
cross-examination in the criminal court proceedings that apparently inspired this requirement; schools
would not be required to apply rules of evidence or make a prosecuting attorney available to object or a
judge available to rule on objections. The live cross examination requirement would also lead to sharp
inequities if one party can afford an attorney and the other cannot.
Neither the Constitution nor any other federal law requires live cross examination in school
conduct proceedings. The Supreme Court does not require any form of cross-examination (live or
indirect) in disciplinary proceedings in public schools under the Due Process clause. Instead, the Court
has explicitly said that a 10-day suspension does not require “the opportunity … to confront and crossexamine witnesses” and has approved at least one circuit court decision holding that expulsion does not
require “a full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to cross-examine witnesses.”The vast majority of
courts that have reached the issue have agreed that live cross-examination is not required in public school
disciplinary proceedings, as long as there is a meaningful opportunity to have questions posed by a
hearing examiner. The Department itself admits that written questions submitted by students or oral
questions asked by a neutral school official are fair and effective ways to discern the truth in K-12
schools, and proposes retaining that method for K-12 proceedings. the Department has not explained why
the processes that it considers effective for addressing harassment in proceedings involving 17- or 18year-old students in high school would be ineffective for 17- or 18-year-old students in college.
Not surprisingly, Title IX and student conduct experts oppose these proposed rules. The
Association of Title IX Administrators (ATIXA) announced in October 2018 that it opposes live,
adversarial cross-examination, instead stating, “investigators should solicit questions from the parties, and
pose those questions the investigators deem appropriate in the investigation interviews.” The Association
for Student Conduct Administration (ASCA) agrees that schools should “limit[] advisors’ participation in

student conduct proceedings.” The American Bar Association recommends that schools provide “the
opportunity for both parties to ask questions through the hearing chair.”
c. The proposed rules would allow schools to pressure survivors into traumatizing
mediation procedures with their assailants.
Proposed § 106.45(b)(6) would allow schools to use “any informal resolution process, such as
mediation” to resolve a complaint of sexual harassment, as long as the school obtains the students’
“voluntary, written consent.” Once consent is obtained and the informal process begins, schools may
“preclude[] the parties from resuming a formal complaint.”
Mediation is a strategy often used in schools to resolve peer conflict, where both sides must take
responsibility for their actions and come to a compromise. Mediation is never appropriate for resolving
sexual assault or harassment, even on a voluntary basis. Survivors should not be pressured to “work
things out” with their assailant (as though they share responsibility for the assault) or exposed to the risk
of being retraumatized, coerced, or bullied during the mediation process. As the Department recognized
in the 2001 Guidance, students in both K-12 and higher education can be pressured into mediation
without informed consent, and even “voluntary” consent to mediation is inappropriate to resolve cases of
sexual assault. Experts also agree that mediation is inappropriate for resolving sexual violence. For
example, NASPA - Student Affairs Administrators in Higher Education stated in 2018 that it was
concerned about students being “pressured into informal resolution against their will.” The proposed rule
would allow schools to pressure survivors, including minors, into giving “consent” to mediation and other
informal processes with their assailants and prevent them from ending an informal process and requesting
a formal investigation—even if they change their mind and realize that mediation is too traumatizing to
continue.
d. The proposed rules would force many schools to use a more demanding standard of
proof to investigate sexual harassment than they would use to investigate other types of
student misconduct.
The Department’s longstanding practice requires that schools use a “preponderance of the
evidence” standardwhich means “more likely than not”in Title IX cases to decide whether sexual
harassment occurred. Proposed rule § 106.45(b)(4)(i) departs from that practice, and establishes a system
where schools could elect to use the more demanding “clear and convincing evidence” standard in sexual
harassment cases, while allowing all other student misconduct cases to be governed by the preponderance
of the evidence standard, even if they carry the same maximum penalties. The Department’s decision to
allow schools to impose a more burdensome standard in sexual assault cases than in any other student
misconduct case appears to rely on the unspoken stereotype and assumption that survivors (who are
mostly women) are more likely to lie about sexual assault than students who report physical assault,
plagiarism, or other school disciplinary violations. There is no basis for that sexist belief and in fact men
and boys are far more likely to be victims of sexual assault than to be falsely accused of sexual assault.
The preponderance standard is used by courts in all civil rights cases. It is the only standard of
proof that treats both sides equally and is consistent with Title IX’s requirement that grievance procedures
be “equitable.” By allowing schools to use a “clear and convincing evidence” standard, the proposed rule
would tilt investigations in favor of respondents and against complainants. The Department argues that
Title IX investigations may need a more demanding standard because of the “heightened stigma” and the
“significant, permanent, and far-reaching” consequences for respondents if they are found responsible for
sexual harassment. But the Department ignores the reality that Title IX complainants face “heightened
stigma” for reporting sexual harassment as compared to other types of misconduct, and that complainants
suffer “significant, permanent, and far-reaching” consequences to their education if their school fails to

meaningfully address the harassment, particularly as 34% of college survivors drop out of college. Both
students have an equal interest in obtaining an education. Catering only to the impacts on respondents in
designing a grievance process to address harassment is inequitable.
Moreover, Title IX experts support the preponderance standard, which is used to address
harassment complaints at over 80% of colleges. The NCHERM Group, whose white paper Due Process
and the Sex Police was cited by the Department, has promulgated materials that require schools to use the
preponderance standard, because “[w]e believe higher education can acquit fairness without higher
standards of proof.” The white paper by four Harvard professors that is cited by the Department
recognizes that schools should use the preponderance standard if “other requirements for equal fairness
are met.” The Association of Title IX Administrators (ATIXA)’s position is that “any standard higher
than preponderance advantages those accused of sexual violence (mostly men) over those alleging sexual
violence (mostly women). It makes it harder for women to prove they have been harmed by men. The
whole point of Title IX is to create a level playing field for men and women in education, and the
preponderance standard does exactly that. No other evidentiary standard is equitable.” NASPA - Student
Affairs Administrators in Higher Education recommends the preponderance standard: “Allowing
campuses to single out sexual assault incidents as requiring a higher burden of proof than other campus
adjudication processes make it – by definition – harder for one party in a complaint than the other to reach
the standard of proof. Rather than leveling the field for survivors and respondents, setting a standard
higher than preponderance of the evidence tilts proceedings to unfairly benefit respondents.” The
Association for Student Conduct Administration (ASCA) agrees that schools should “[u]se the
preponderance of evidence (more likely than not) standard to resolve all allegations of sexual
misconduct” because “it is the only standard that reflects the integrity of equitable student conduct
processes which treat all students with respect and fundamental fairness.”
e.

The proposed rules fail to impose clear timeframes for investigations and allow
impermissible delays.

The proposed rules require schools to have “reasonably prompt timeframes,” but allows them to
create a “temporary delay” or “limited extension” of timeframes for “good cause,” which includes
“concurrent law enforcement activity.” In contrast, Title IX guidance issued by the Obama administration
recommended that schools finish investigations within 60 days, and prohibited schools from delaying a
Title IX investigation just because there was an ongoing criminal investigation.
Under the proposed rules, if there is an ongoing criminal investigation, the school would be
allowed to delay its Title IX investigation for an unspecified length of time. While criminal investigations
seek to punish an abuser for their conduct, Title IX investigations should seek to ensure that complainants
are able to access educational opportunities that become inaccessible due to harassment. Students should
not be forced to wait months or years until after a criminal investigation is completed in order to seek
resolution from their schools. The Association of Title IX Administrators (ATIXA) agrees that a school
that “delay[s] or suspend[s] its investigation” at the request of a prosecutor creates a safety risk to the
survivor and to “other students, as well.”
f.

The proposed rules would require schools to give unequal appeal rights.

Although Secretary DeVos claims that the proposed rules make “[a]ppeal rights equally available
to both parties,” they do not in fact provide equal grounds for appeal to both parties, as complainants are
barred from appealing a school’s resolution of a harassment complaint based on inadequate sanctions
imposed on a respondent. Allowing only the respondent the right to appeal a sanction decision is both
unfair and a violation of the requirement of “equitable” procedures, because survivors are also impacted

by sanction decisions. For example, if their abuser is still allowed to live in the same dorm as the
survivor, or if they are still in the same classroom, the survivor may experience further trauma.
Experts support equal appeal rights. The American Bar Association recommends that the grounds
for appeal include “a sanction disproportionate to the findings in the case (that is, too lenient or too
severe).” The Association of Title IX Administrators (ATIXA) announced in October 2018 that it
supports equal rights to appeal for both parties, “[d]espite indications that OCR will propose regulations
that permit inequitable appeals.” Even the white paper by four Harvard professors that is cited by the
Department (p.9-10 n.2) recognizes that schools should allow “[e]ach party (respondent and complainant)
[to] request an impartial appeal.”
VI.

The Proposed Rules are Inconsistent with the Clery Act.

A number of the Department’s proposed rules are inconsistent with the Clery Act, which the
Department also enforces, and which also addresses the obligation of colleges and universities to respond
to sexual assault and other behaviors that may constitute sexual harassment, including dating violence,
domestic violence, and stalking. For example, the proposed rules prohibiting schools from investigating
off-campus and online sexual harassment conflict with Clery’s reporting requirements. The Clery Act
requires colleges and universities to notify all students who report sexual assault, stalking, dating violence,
and domestic violence of their rights, regardless of “whether the offense occurred on or off campus.” The
Clery Act also requires colleges and universities to report all sexual assault, stalking, dating violence, and
domestic violence that occur on “Clery geography,” which includes all property controlled by a schoolrecognized student organization (such as an off-campus fraternity); nearby “public property”; and “areas
within the patrol jurisdiction of the campus police or the campus security department.” The proposed rules
would undermine Clery’s mandate and create a perverse system in which schools would be required to
report instances of sexual assault that occur off-campus to the Department, but would be required by the
Department to dismiss these complaints and not investigate them.
Clery also requires that investigations of sexual harassment and assault be “prompt, fair, and
impartial.” But the proposed rules’ unclear timeframe for investigations conflicts with Clery’s mandate that
investigations be prompt. And the many proposed rules discussed above that tilt investigation procedures
in favor of the respondent are anything but fair and impartial.
Although the Department acknowledges that Title IX and the Clery Act’s “jurisdictional schemes
… may overlap in certain situations,” it fails to explain how institutions of higher education should resolve
the conflicts between two different sets of rules when addressing sexual harassment. These different sets of
rules would likely create widespread confusion for schools.
VII.

The proposed rules requiring schools to dismiss harassment complaints go beyond Ed’s
authority to effectuate the nondiscrimination provisions of Title IX and are practically
unworkable.

Section 106.45(b)(3) of the proposed rules requires schools to dismiss complaints of sexual
harassment if they don’t meet specific narrow standards. If it’s determined that harassment doesn’t meet
the improperly narrow definition of severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive harassment, it must be
dismissed, per the command of the rule. If severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive conduct occurs
outside of an educational program or activity, including most off-campus or online harassment, it must be
dismissed. However, the Department lacks the authority to require schools to dismiss complaints of
discrimination. Under Title IX, the Department is only authorized to issue rules “to effectuate the [antidiscrimination] provision of [Title IX].” Title IX does not delegate to the Department the authority to tell

schools when they cannot protect students against sex discrimination. By requiring schools to dismiss
certain types of complaints of sexual harassment, without regard to whether those forms of harassment
deny students educational opportunities on the basis of sex, § 106.45(b)(3) fails to effectuate Title IX’s
anti-discrimination mandate and would force many schools that already investigate off-campus conduct
under their student conduct policies to abandon these anti-discrimination efforts. While the Department is
well within its authority to require schools to adopt civil rights protections to effectuate Title IX’s
mandate against sex discrimination, it is does not have authority to force schools to violate students’ and
employees’ civil rights under Title IX by forcing schools to ignore sexual harassment.
The Department notes that if conduct doesn’t meet the proposed rule’s definition of harassment or
occurs off-campus, schools may still process the complaint under a different conduct code, but not Title
IX. This “solution” to its required dismissals for Title IX investigations is confusing and impractical. The
proposed regulations offer no guidance or safe harbor for schools to offer parallel sexual harassment
proceedings that do not comply with the detailed and burdensome procedural requirements set out in the
proposed rule. Schools that did so would no doubt be forced to contend with respondents’ complaints that
the school had failed to comply with the requirements set out in the NPRM and thus violated respondents’
rights as described in the NPRM.
--------------The Department’s proposed rules import inappropriate legal standards into agency enforcement,
rely on sexist stereotypes about survivors of sexual harassment and assault, and impose procedural
requirements that force schools to tilt their Title IX investigation processes in favor of named harassers to
the detriment of survivors. Instead of effectuating Title IX’s prohibition on sex discrimination in schools,
these rules serve only to protect schools from liability when they fail to address complaints of sexual
harassment and assault. The Maine Women’s Lobby calls on the Department of Education to immediately
withdraw this NPRM and instead focus its energies on vigorously enforcing the Title IX requirements that
the Department has relied on for decades, to ensure that schools promptly and effectively respond to
sexual harassment.
Thank you for the opportunity to submit comments on the NPRM. Please do not hesitate to contact me to
provide further information.
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